

## What's Behind the Spread of Investments in Microfinance? Financial Attractiveness or Social Responsible Investments

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### Abstract

The conviction that microfinance contributes to the reduction of poverty has attracted various investors in the sector. With the continuous growth of investments in microfinance, if the social motive is the most plausible, one would expect countries with high rates of poverty and financial exclusion to be the most attractive for investments in this sector. Aiming to understand whether the distribution of investments in different regions is led by the attractiveness of these regions in terms of risk and return or rather in terms of social impact, we use aggregate data on funds invested in the sector through Microfinance Investment Vehicles (MIVs) to study the spread of investments in microfinance around the world. It comes from the results that investments are attracted by financial performance of MFIs in the different regions, considering the return on assets and the return on equity. Further, the expenses over the assets ratio which influences negatively the variation of the investments destination suggests that regions with high costs MFIs don't receive much funds from investors. On the other side, investments seem to be oriented towards regions in which there are already institutions offering financial services, but regions with less access to financial services don't look to be the destination of investments. Is search for profit the most important driver for investments in microfinance? The results seem to go in that direction, but further research with a wider and deeper database would bring more light. However, the outcomes allow us to confirm that even if it is believed to be a poverty fighting tool, not all the investments in the microfinance sector aim the contribution to poverty reduction.

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**Keywords:** Microfinance; Investments; Profit; Social; Commercialization

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### INTRODUCTION

Since microfinance is in the spotlight with the 'Nobelization' of Muhammad Yunus and the Grameen Bank in 2006 for having developed a way to promote access to financial products for poor women from Bangladesh, debates have emerged in the last decade, some on the impact of microfinance in reducing poverty (Hulme, 2000; Karlan, 2001; Sharma and Buchenrieder, 2002; Guérin, 2014). Also discussions about innovative ways facilitating access of poor households to financial services while avoiding high default rates, such as group lending, progressive lending, village banking, etc took place (Morduch, 1999). Others, interested rather in the financial performance of microfinance institutions, show that very few MFIs are financially viable and less profitable because of the high cost of the activity related essentially to microcredits (Sarma & Borbora, 2011; Olasupo et al., 2014; Kipesha & Zhang, 2013)

This led discussions on whether it is possible for a microfinance organization to sustainably provide microcredits without subsidies (Morduch, 1999, Nawaz, 2010, Hudon, 2010). Research has shown that non-profit microfinance organizations, generally not allowed to collect savings (Mersland and Strom, 2008), are subsidized the most. With the evolution of the industry, the other type of microfinance organizations 'non-bank financial institutions' can access commercial loans, with repercussions such as high interest rates, often considered as the driver of mission drift. The Compartamos IPO in 2007 is a case that has particularly stimulated much debate about mission drift on one hand, and governance of Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) on the other hand. The debates mentioned above are based for most on what is supposed to be the microfinance mission. It is supposed to contribute to the reduction of poverty, or to widen the field of possibilities for poor households by

facilitating their access to financial services and improve their standards of life. This do not let indifferent decision makers and investors. There is indeed reasons to question whether the investments in microfinance are driven by the profit motive or by social motive, the last being the most considered aspect of microfinance

In the case the second motive for investment in microfinance mentioned above is the most plausible, one would expect that countries with high rates of poverty and financial exclusion are the most attractive for investments in this sector

In general, as supported by Honohan (2008), the financial sector mobilizes and concentrates resources for investment and allocates them based on an assessment of risk and return. What is the trend like in the microfinance sector? A few research has been devoted to the study of the motivations of investors interested in microfinance.

Mersland and Urgehe (2011) study the degree to which international debt investments are related to the financial and social performance of MFIs. This study uses data from microfinance institutions by distinguishing the source of funds by commercial investments and social investments. Their finding is that the first kind of investments are related to financial performance while the second is driven by the targeting of women. The regional affiliation of MFIs is not considered in this analysis.

Galema & Spierdijk (2011), in their study focused on the attractiveness of the microfinance sector, based on a survey on microfinance institutions use a spanning methodology to investigate whether adding microfinance to a benchmark portfolio of international assets is beneficial for investors, that is, it allows to reach a mean-variance efficient portfolio. The finding is that microfinance can provide an attractive investment opportunity even if investors are interested only in risk and return.

With respect to geography, their results imply that investing in MFIs from Latin America improves the mean-variance frontier, what is not the case for MFIs from Africa. In other words, the analysis indicates that it is more attractive for microfinance investors to invest in the first region than in the last. However, it is possible that the riskier regions for investments in microfinance are the ones which need the most the investments in order to promote financial inclusion.

As stressed by Galema & Spierdijk (2011), microfinance can be attractive anywhere if the investors value the fact that microfinance has a social aim.

Another study by Lauren and Kayla (2012) aimed to measure which characteristics of a particular loan matter most to lenders in the absence of an interest rate to serve as a price for loanable funds and a measure of risk with data from kiva.org, a peer-to-peer lending platform. To do so, they measured the length of time it takes each loan to be funded from the time it is posted to the kiva website. The study shows that this time depends amongst other factors on the loan amount, small loans being more quickly funded, the exchange rate risk to the lender, the MFI's default rate, the sex of the borrower, women being funded faster than men. Geographically speaking, the results reveal that a borrower from Sub-Saharan Africa is more likely to be funded faster on average than a borrower from any other region followed by West Africa and the Americas.

In deeds, since microfinance has been believed to have a potential of poverty reduction, investments in this sector are growing year after year (Symbiotics MIV surveys, 2014), and there is a reason to ask whether these investments are led by the aim of contributing to poverty reduction, or by different motivations, that can be social or commercial.

The studies above attempt to explain the likelihood of investments to be oriented in different regions of the globe, depending either on the behaviour of the investors (Lauren & Kayla, 2012), or on the attractiveness of the region (Galema & Spierdijk, 2011). The results in the first, based on an internet based platform, concern individuals who lend on average<sup>1</sup> \$1382.6 each and \$10,000 maximum and does not seem significant, compared to the \$13 billion the microfinance sector receives through microfinance investment vehicles (Symbiotics MIV survey, 2014), and the second is based on a survey led on individual MFIs, and does not deal with the spread of investments in microfinance on a global basis.

Thus, the aim of this paper is to answer the following questions: What leads the spread of investments in microfinance around the world? In other words, considering the social mission of microfinance, do Microfinance Institutions from the poorer regions of the globe attract more investments?

With aggregate data on a global level, we will investigate on the real spread of investments in microfinance around the world (made through microfinance investments vehicles) in order to understand whether the geographical allocation of different funds in different regions is influenced by the social goal of contribution to poverty reduction or not, i.e. the attractiveness of these regions in terms of the value of social investment or rather in terms of the profitability evaluation.

The rest of this paper is organised as follows: the second section describes the variables, the expected relationships between the variables, the estimation methodology and the data. The third section present the results before the forth concludes.

## MATERIALS AND METHODS

### Explanatory Variables of the Spread of Investments

We categorise the investments destination in 5 main regions: Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Latin America and Caribbean, Middle East and North Africa, South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa. To determine the drivers of the spread of microfinance investments in the world, whether it is influenced by the search for profitability or the sense of social investment and financial inclusion, we use the variables that follow:

To measure the search for profitability as a motive for investment, we consider the Return On Assets ratio (ROA) as appropriate, and not the Return on Equity (ROE), given the considerable variation in debt to equity ratios from an MFI to another (Mersland & Strøm, 2008). For each region, we'll consider the average ROA. Further, we use the average default rate of each region, here the portfolio at risk, 30 days overdue (PaR30) as MFIs related risk of investing in the region. In the microfinance literature and practice, lending to women or/and to poorer households (Morduch & Armendariz, 2005), outreach in rural areas and grant of small size loans (Mersland & Strøm, 2008) are often considered as having more social impact.

Labie et al. (2013) suggest the use of the MACBETH<sup>2</sup> approach as an investment screening method more tailored to the socially responsible investors' specific values to help them take investment decisions accordingly.

Here, to capture the motive for social investment, we take into account the percentage of female borrowers in the MFIs of each region. The average percentage of women among MFI borrowers in each region is then used for comparison. The percentage of the population living on less than \$ 1.25 in each region is used as a proxy for poverty level. Here again, the regional average will serve for comparison.

A number of control variables which could capture the orientation of investments towards a given region or another are also included. First, we include financial inclusion indicators (Ardic et al, 2011; Demirguc-K et al., 2013) aggregated by region, given that areas with weak financial inclusion should be attractive for more investments (account ownership by percentage of adults).

Also included are the Return on Equity which can be correlated with the ROA, and the Operating expenses over the assets ratio which is an indicator that potential funders can use to assess the robustness of an MFI (Mersland & Urgeghe, 2011).

Finally, doing business indicators are included. There are studies which found significant the relation between foreign development investment and Doing Business. Thus, they suggest that higher doing business rankings can be associated with more foreign investment (Blonigen & Piger, 2011; Hornberger, Battat & Kusek, 2011). We use two doing business indicators (the facility of creation of a new enterprise, investors protection mechanisms) as further control variables.

## METHODOLOGY

### The Econometric Model

In order to link these explanatory variables explained above to the dependent variable, that is the share of investments in microfinance attracted by different regions over the period 2006 – 2012, a cross-section model is specified.

The explained variable being the destination of investments, (INV) represents the share of the overall investments in the sector going to the region, and the explanatory variables being the average Return On Assets of MFIs of the region (AROA), the average portfolio at risk 30 days of the region (APAR30), the average percentage of female borrowers in each region (APFB), the poverty level of the region (POVLEV), and the control variables being the number of depositors in credit unions and financial cooperatives per thousand adults (NDEP), the average Return on Equity of MFIs of the region (AROE), the average level of operating expenses over the assets of the region (OPEXAS), the average of the indicator of the facility of creation of an enterprise for each region (FCE), the average of the region for the indicator of protection of investors (PRINV) and the average GDP per capita (GDPPC), the following model is estimated:

$$INV_{i,t} = \alpha_i + \beta_1 AROA_{i,t} + \beta_2 APAR30_{i,t} + \beta_3 APFB_{i,t} + \beta_4 POVLEV_{i,t} + \beta_5 NDEP_{i,t} + \beta_6 AROE_{i,t} + \beta_7 OPEXAS_{i,t} + \beta_8 FCE_{i,t} + \beta_9 PRINV_{i,t} + \beta_{10} GDPPC_{i,t} + \mu_{i,t} \quad (1)$$

$\alpha_i$ , and  $\beta_1$  to  $\beta_{10}$  being the estimators,  $i$  being the region, and

$t$  being the period

Thus,  $INV_{i,t}$  is the share of investments going to the region  $i$  at the time  $t$ ,  $AROA_{i,t}$  is the average ROA of the region  $i$  at the time  $t$ , etc. and  $\mu_{i,t}$  the error term.

### The Data

The data used to estimate the model above was collected from different sources, depending on the nature of the data and the availability. The data on investments come from the MIV survey reports, from 2006 to 2012, which covers 95% of MIVs operating in the microfinance industry and represented over US\$ 8 Billion in 2013 (MicroRate, 2013). The limit of this source is that information varies from a year to another, given the availability of certain data the year following the year of the survey. To overcome this issue, we considered the latest report. An alternative solution could be information from the mix, but this is limited from 2007 to 2011, and the source of the information here is declarative. Thus, the MIV surveys, based on the MIVs reports are the best available source of data.

The data on the MFIs performance indicators for each region are from the MIX database, with information from 233 MFIs from the Eastern Europe and Central Asia, 160 MFIs from East Asia and the Pacific, 352 MFIs from the Latin America and the Caribbean, 55 MFIs from the Middle East and North Africa, 208 MFIs from South Asia and 248 MFIs from the Sub-Saharan Africa. Krauss and Walter (2008) give credit to this source of information considering that to provide required documentation, the MFIs should have adequate information structures. The data obtained from the Mix for our study are the return on assets, the return on equity, the percentage of female borrowers, the portfolio at risk at 30 days and the operating expenses over the assets ratio. We consider the weighted average of these indicators for each region.

The data concerning the financial inclusion, which is the number of depositors per 1000 adults are from Financial Access Survey (FAS), a database also used by (Demirguc-K et al, 2013) in their policy research working papers on measuring financial access around the world. We arranged the data by structuring them by region, and then calculated the average for each region. (See Table 6 of the Index).

As the proxy for the poverty level, we consider the percent of people living on less than US\$ 1,25 and the GDP per capita, both available on the world bank website. We restructured these data by region, and calculated the average poverty level and GDP per capita for each region, but we adjust them for the outliers by removing the oil-based economies. Our aim by doing this is to get the average poverty level only for the regions where there is not much alternative economic activities contributing to the GDP.

The country-based doing business ranking allowed us to calculated regional doing business indicators (the facility of creation of a new enterprise, investors

protection mechanisms) thanks to the database available on doingbusiness.org.

### RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

After applying the Least squares to estimate our model, equation (1), the results of our estimation appear in the table that follows

Table 1. Regression Results (before adjustments

	Coeff	Std. Err	t-Stat	Prob
C	-24.85943	20.37436	-1.220133	0.2316
AROA	1.210812	1.469116	-6.807370	0.0000
APAR30	0.479130	0.384262	1.246886	0.2218
APFB	0.181942	0.094719	1.920854	0.0640
POVLEV	-0.249868	0.176532	-1.415427	0.1669
NDEP	0.037817	0.008314	4.548846	0.0001
AROE	2.125046	0.277259	7.664476	0.0000
OPEXAS	1.794459	0.676432	2.652831	0.0125
FCE	-0.240619	0.195565	-1.230374	0.2278
PRNV	0.222958	0.276292	0.806963	0.4258
GDPPC	0.000594	0.000964	0.616435	0.5421
R-squared	0.890996			
Adjusted R-squared	0.855833			
S.E. of regression	5.568374			
Sum squared resid	961.2103			
Log likelihood	-125.3364			
F-statistic	25.33932			
Prob(F-statistic)	0.000000			
Akaike info criter	6.492210			
Schwarz criterion	6.947314			
Cross-sec. incl.	6			
Tot panel (balanced) obs.	42			

Source: Result of the regression

According to these results, our regression is of good quality. The Adjusted R-squared statistic (0,85) indicates that 85% of variations of the investments in different regions are explained by variations in explanatory variables included in the model. However, the probability related to the coefficients reveals that number of explanatory variables are not statistically significant. To assess the validity of our model, we analyze first the multicollinearity dimension by examining the correlations between the explanatory variables. This is shown in the table below:

The analysis of this matrix, for the multicollinearity presumption test of Klein indicates that all the correlation coefficients are inferior to the R-squared statistic. We can presume the rejection of the multicollinearity.

Table 2. Correlations between explanatory variables

	ARO A	AROE	NDEP	OPEXAS	APFB
ARO A	1.000000				
AROE	<b>0.875268</b>	1.000000			
NDEP	0.028263	0.099623	1.000000		
OPEXAS	0.482676	0.332332	-0.330959	1.000000	
APFB	-0.080759	-0.180637	-0.532481	-0.016178	1.000000
APAR30	-0.199809	-0.212805	-0.127914	0.319677	0.336816
PRINV	-0.210648	0.036028	0.138231	-0.235370	-0.477243
FCE	-0.384096		-0.263189	0.651610	-0.596772
POVLEV	0.023155	0.074662	-0.776992	0.338237	0.417993
GDPPC	0.342880	0.249555	0.511355	0.247262	-0.255639
APAR30	1.000000				
PRINV	-0.245530	1.000000			
FCE	0.010089	0.098359	1.000000		
POVLEV	0.256122	-0.013976	-0.594670	1.000000	
GDPPC	0.016136	-0.163920	0.302634	-0.730659	1.000000

Source: Result of the regression

However, the  $r$  (ARO A, AROE) = 0,87 is too close to the R-squared statistic (0,89). We apply the Farrar-Glober test to have more precision.

The null hypothesis of this test, assuming the presence of multicollinearity, is accepted if the determinant of the correlations matrix between explanatory variables is 1, and rejected if the determinant is less than 1. The determinant of our matrix  $D=0,000207$  and confirms the rejection of the multicollinearity for this model.

To reach a better result, we eliminate all the variables which are the least significant, and obtain the following model to be estimated:

$$INV_{i,t} = \alpha_i + \beta_1 ARO A_{i,t} + \beta_3 APFB_{i,t} + \beta_4 POVLEV_{i,t} + \beta_5 NDEP_{i,t} + \beta_6 AROE_{i,t} + \beta_7 OPEXAS_{i,t} + \mu_{i,t} \quad (2)$$

From the previous model (equation 1), we have eliminated the variables APAR30 (average portfolio at rist 30 days), FCE (facility of creation of enterprise), PRINV (protection of investors), and GDPPC (GDP per capita) which where the least significant.

The results of the estimation are summarized in the table below:

Table 3. Regression Results (After adjustments)

Dependant variable	INV			
	Coeff	Std. Err	t-Stat	Prob
C	-30.18004	7.375791	4.091771	0.0002
ARO A	1.350270	1.221193	8.475894	0.0000
APFB	0.163491	0.062926	2.598141	0.0136
POVLEV	-0.282327	0.083412	3.384747	0.0018
NDEP	0.035058	0.006067	5.778112	0.0000
AROE	2.196816	0.240842	9.121390	0.0000
OPEXAS	-2.487312	1.067667	0.571509	0.5715

R-squared 0.877392

Adjusted R-squared 0.856374

S.E. of regression 5.557928

Sum squared resid 1081.170

Log likelihood -127.8061

F-statistic 41.74386

Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000

Akaike info criter 6.419340

Schwarz criterion 6.708951

Cross-sec. incl. 6

Tot panel (balanced)

obs. 42

Source: Result of the regression

The results above shows that the estimation has been ameliorated, when we consider that all the explanatory variables are now significant, and that the Akaike and the Schwarz criterion have been minimized. Further, the variables included in the model still explain more than 85% of the variation of the investments in different regions of the globe.

It comes from these results that investments are attracted by financial performance of MFIs in the regions, considering the return on assets, the return on equity which have significant and positive coefficients. Further, the higher the operating expenses over the assets, the lower the level of the investments.

However, this variable is not statistically significant. Overall, this finding mirrors the results found by Mersland and Urgeghe (2011), which show that commercial investments are related to financial performance of the MFIs. Here, we have pooled all the

kinds of investments (social and for profit) to assess the motives of the spread of investments on a global basis. The expenses over the assets ratio which influences negatively the variation of the investment destination suggests on the other hand that MFIs with high costs don't receive much funds from investors, while most of them are those operating in rural areas (Polhamus, 2008; Paxton & Cuevas, 2002). Indeed, as said above, investments are mainly directed to regions with financially well performing microfinance institutions.

Another outcome is that the number of depositors in credit unions and financial cooperatives influences significantly and positively the share of investments in a region, which suggests that investments are oriented towards regions in which there are already institutions offering financial services, but regions with less access to financial services don't seem to be the destination of investments.

This corroborate with the finding of Vanroose (2014) based on a study in Peru, which shows that MFIs are implemented in districts where other MFIs already exist, creating concentration in cities and districts with higher level of development. This could be the trend, leading the concentration of microfinance investments in certain regions, like Latin America and the Caribbean with 37% of all the investments, and the Eastern Europe and Central Asia with 36%. (See table 1 of the appendix).

On the other hand, there is a significant positive influence of the percentage of female borrowers on the destination of investments. This explains the position of South Asia, which is the third destination of investments in microfinance (but only 8%). Indeed, in this region (Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, etc.) the percentage of female borrowers reached 91% in 2012. The negative correlation between the number of depositors in microfinance institutions and the percentage of female borrowers (table 2 above) suggests that the regions with the least financial access are also the ones where women are granted more microcredits.

Finally, the poorer regions seem not to be the main destinations of the investments. This could be explained by the fact that the majority of investments are of commercial nature (for profit), and target MFIs with good financial performance. These MFIs are not generally located in poorer regions. While these results present findings on a global scale, the distinction between commercial investments and social investments, as done in Mersland & Urgeghe (2011) shows that those who invest in poorer regions or by targeting women are not those who invest in more developed regions.

## CONCLUSION

This analysis of the spread of investments around the world since 2006, the date on which Muhammad Yunus received the Peace Nobel price, examined on a global scale the drivers of the investments in microfinance. Since investors have been discovering the microfinance sector, some of them found in it an additional channel of contributing to poverty alleviation by targeting women or to improve financial access. The findings of this study show that profit motive is the most important driver of investments in this sector. The poorer regions and those with more female borrowers receive only 15% of the investments, while more than 75% of the investments are led towards regions where microfinance institutions have better financial performance.

The limitations of this study lay in the data used for the estimation of the model, specifically the source of the information and the use of aggregate data. The data on investments come from the MIV survey reports by Symbiotics, reports in which information varies from a year to another, due to the availability of additional data in the year following the year of the survey. However, these reports cover 95% of MIVs operating in the microfinance industry. Further, the use of aggregate data (averages) for information on the social and financial performance of different regions undermines the specificities of different MFIs. In fact, investments are not made in regions initially, but in the MFIs in different regions. Thus, the use of a wider and deeper database made of information on individual performance of different MFIs from the different regions would bring more light on the evidence found from the results.

However, these limitations do not weaken the finding that with microfinance in the spotlight, it appears to have been the discovering of an opportunity for commercial investors searching new portfolio diversification sectors for their investments, and not necessarily for contribution to poverty reduction

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**APPENDIX**

In the tables that follow, we present the different data based on which we estimated our model. Hereafter, the meanings of the abbreviations inside:

EECA: Eastern Europe and Central Asia

Latin America and the Caribbean

EAP: East Asia and the Pacific

MENA: Mean East and Northern Africa

SA: South Asia

SSA: Sub-Saharan Africa

Table 1. MIV Portfolio Regional Breakdown as % of Direct Microfinance Portfolio

	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
<b>EECA</b>	32	38	43	35	37	34	33
<b>LAC</b>	42	41	35	37	35	37	36
<b>EAP</b>	1	4	4	7	8	11	12
<b>MENA</b>	11	2	3	9	8	1	4
<b>SSA</b>	9	7	5	6	5	8	7
<b>SA</b>	5	8	10	9	7	9	8

Source : Symbiotics, MIV survies 2013

Table 2. Average Return On Assets in different Regions (Weighted)

	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
<b>SSA</b>	2,266	2,899	3,396	2,562	3,130	3,518	3,433
<b>EAP</b>	-1,320	0,350	0,016	-0,169	0,100	0,834	1,014
<b>EEAC</b>	2,318	2,390	1,991	0,657	1,135	2,483	2,511
<b>LAC</b>	3,042	3,181	2,600	1,753	2,402	2,828	2,178
<b>MENA</b>	4,474	4,578	1,713	1,764	3,146	2,877	5,127
<b>SA</b>	2,906	1,532	1,286	2,916	2,185	-3,034	-3,962

Source: MixMarket.org

Table 3. Average Return On Equity in different Regions (Weighted)

	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
<b>SSA</b>	9,726	12,470	16,557	14,209	16,454	18,618	17,771
<b>EAP</b>	-4,757	1,354	0,063	-0,775	0,844	8,873	11,097
<b>EEAC</b>	15,307	15,554	13,082	3,939	6,454	14,701	13,920
<b>LAC</b>	19,190	20,278	15,872	10,532	13,669	16,022	13,068
<b>MENA</b>	9,041	12,491	5,151	5,030	8,544	7,346	11,316
<b>SA</b>	15,217	8,538	6,933	15,659	11,277	-15,142	-22,386

Source: MixMarket.org

Table 4. PaR &gt; 30 days (Weighted)

	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
<b>SSA</b>	6,173	5,904	7,807	7,411	6,123	2,016	3,513
EAP	1,307	0,844	0,789	1,221	0,332	0,531	0,093
EEAC	1,979	1,668	2,768	9,355	6,914	2,750	2,289
LAC	4,375	4,073	6,869	7,671	5,670	6,005	5,724
MENA	3,595	2,725	4,233	4,546	3,252	2,406	3,344
SA	4,499	2,287	3,906	3,324	13,992	14,247	9,445

Source: MixMarket.org

Table 5. Percent of female borrowers (Weighted)

	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
<b>SSA</b>	49,417	54,090	52,873	50,862	52,266	62,248	59,471
EAP	24,592	63,307	46,316	28,102	50,674	71,89	54,411
EEAC	28,896	28,513	26,504	28,907	38,650	45,836	44,881
LAC	54,959	54,230	50,824	46,501	51,213	54,981	47,452
MENA	66,097	65,185	52,130	49,018	59,045	47,240	57,104
SA	87,425	70,316	88,534	79,585	89,337	84,137	91,918

Source: MixMarket.org

Table 6. Depositors with credit unions and financial cooperatives per 1 000 adults

	<b>2006</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>
<b>EAP</b>	350,65	371,51	383,98	393,27	411,41	467,71	493,57
<b>EECA</b>	980,84	1022,61	945,32	984,88	970,55	1000,62	1061,91
<b>LAC</b>	406,81	473,55	502,77	569,10	616,26	651,86	694,10
<b>MENA</b>	514,83	535,99	486,30	496,44	499,75	515,22	531,25
<b>SA</b>	279,51	294,91	282,66	294,75	316,05	367,97	392,88
<b>SSA</b>	155,06	157,55	173,59	185,51	218,63	223,95	268,67

Source: Financial Access Survey (FAS)

Table 7. Operating expenses/assets

	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
<b>EAP</b>	1785,411	2012,842	2282,173	2176,609	2513,534	2905,254	3123,487
<b>EECA</b>	3603,029	4594,491	5695,948	4901,71	5199,937	6008,95	6034,709
<b>LAC</b>	7166,553	7903,314	8661,262	8160,151	8737,315	9260,856	9179,407
<b>MENA</b>	5259,121	6068,239	7907,055	6875,917	7657,919	8184,826	8867,233
<b>SA</b>	1235,425	1461,363	1674,206	1727,14	1940,485	2093,561	2078,514
<b>SSA</b>	1735,508	1964,417	2297,347	1930,386	2241,814	2602,425	2564,785

Source: MixMarket.org

Table 8. Percentage of people living on less than 1,25\$ per day

	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
<b>SSA</b>	52,59	51,58	52,3	49,58	48,5	46,8	46,58
<b>LAC</b>	7,08	6,64	6,5	5,76	5,5	4,6	4,45
<b>EAP</b>	16,07	14,78	14,3	12,2	12,5	7,9	8,83
<b>SA</b>	39,42	37,07	39,4	32,36	31,0	24,5	25,3
<b>EECA</b>	0,98	0,82	0,5	0,5	0,07	0,5	0,03
<b>MENA</b>	3,16	2,95	3,5	2,54	2,4	1,7	1,9

Source: iresearch.worldbank.org

Table 9. Facility of creation of Enterprise

	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
<b>EAP</b>	68,54	68,85	70,11	71,16	74,19	74,98	77,04
<b>EECA</b>	71,92	74,86	77,93	82,00	84,74	86,03	87,21
<b>LAC</b>	65,80	67,95	70,79	72,34	73,69	74,25	75,76
<b>MENA</b>	55,83	56,63	64,03	71,96	74,49	73,62	74,41
<b>SA</b>	71,51	73,06	73,86	75,07	77,18	78,73	79,89
<b>SSA</b>	47,12	48,76	51,81	55,66	58,57	59,07	63,29

Source : [www.doingbusiness.org](http://www.doingbusiness.org)

Table 10. Indicator of Protection of investments

	<b>2006</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>
<b>EAP</b>	52,61	52,64	53,06	53,75	53,89	53,89	54,17
<b>EECA</b>	45,15	46,09	47,10	51,53	52,13	52,93	54,93
<b>LAC</b>	47,78	48,67	48,60	48,60	49,68	49,68	49,06
<b>MENA</b>	40,86	40,86	41,30	42,22	43,52	43,89	45,44
<b>SA</b>	50,00	50,00	50,00	50,00	50,00	50,42	51,25
<b>SSA</b>	41,79	41,83	42,14	42,54	43,41	43,97	44,68

Source : [www.doingbusiness.org](http://www.doingbusiness.org)